




The ILA’s 2018 report on aggression and the use of force∗ 
 
Noam Lubell 
Professor of International Law, University of Essex, UK; Swiss Chair of IHL, The Geneva Academy of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, Switzerland; Rapporteur of the ILA Committee on the Use 
of Force (2010-2018). 
CONTACT: nlubell@essex.ac.uk  
 
Michael Wood 
Barrister, 20 Essex Street Chambers, UK; Member of the UN International Law Commission; Chair of the ILA 





The International Law Association Use of Force Committee’s Final Report on Aggression 






1. Introduction: the ILA and the use of force 
 
The International Law Association (ILA) is a non-governmental organization, founded in 
1873.1 It works mainly through committees and study groups, and through its national 
Branches, as well as holding a major international conference every two years.  
The law on the use of force (the jus ad bellum) has long been a central branch of 
international law. Yet it was only in 2005 (following such controversial episodes as Kosovo 
                                                          
∗ The views expressed in this guest editorial do not necessarily reflect those of the Committee or its members. 
1 Ted Stein, ‘International Law Association (ILA)’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law, vol. V (Oxford University Press, 2012) 872–4. A good deal of information about the 
organisation can be found on the ILA’s website: www.ila-hq.org/.   
2 
 
1999, Afghanistan 2001, and Iraq 2003, and especially ‘the United States’ position following 
the attacks of 11 September 2001 that it was involved in a “global war on terror”’),2 that the 
ILA first established a Committee on the Use of Force (2005-2010). Professor Mary Ellen 
O’Connell (USA) chaired the Committee, with Professor Judith Gardam (Australia) acting as 
rapporteur. This first Committee’s mandate was to prepare a report on the meaning of war or 
armed conflict in international law. Its Final Report3 was adopted in 2010.4 
In 2010 a second ILA Committee on the Use of Force was established (‘the 
Committee’), with the authors of this editorial acting as chairperson and rapporteur. The 
Committee’s mandate focused on aggression, but in practice the Committee found that it 
needed to place the consideration of aggression within a wider context. A wide-ranging Final 
Report was adopted in 2018.5  
The 78th Conference of the ILA took place in Sydney from 19 to 24 August 2018. 
Following a debate at an open working session of the Committee, in resolution 4/2018 the 
Conference took note of the Committee’s Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force 
and commended it to all those concerned with the international law on the use of force.6 The 
Conference endorsed the following conclusions set out in the Final Report:  
 
(a) The UN Charter goal of collective peace and security depends upon strict adherence to 
the international law on the use of force;  
(b) What is needed are not new rules on the use of force, but political will on the part of 
States, including members of the UN Security Council. The Security Council must use 
its powers proactively, positively and with clarity;  
(c) Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (crime of 
aggression) is relevant only to the crime over which the International Criminal Court 
                                                          
2 International Law Association, Committee on the Use of Force (2005-2010), Final Report on the Meaning of 
Armed Conflict in International Law, The Hague Conference (2010) 
https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=1266&StorageFileGuid=84ac02f3-e51a-4308-
adf0-e94256758f38, 1.  
3 Ibid. 
4 International Law Association, Resolution 6/2010 (Use of Force), The Hague Conference (2010) 
https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=1265&StorageFileGuid=bbfe9ebd-38e6-4a28-
b0e8-586e14572c3a. 
5 International Law Association, Committee on the Use of Force (2010-2018), Final Report on Aggression and 
the Use of Force, Sydney Conference (2018) 
https://ila.vettoreweb.com/Storage/Download.aspx?DbStorageId=11391&StorageFileGuid=6a499340-074d-
4d4b-851b-7a56871175d6 (hereafter, ‘Report’).   





has jurisdiction; it neither affects the definition of ‘act of aggression’ within the 
meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter nor should it lead to a diminished appreciation 
of the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and customary 
international law, and the constraints on States resulting therefrom;  
(d) Overall the current international law on the use of force, properly interpreted and 
applied, remains a solid ‘cornerstone’ for international peace and security.   
 
The Conference further called on all states to observe strictly the rules of international law 
concerning the use of force.7 
The second ILA Committee on the Use of Force had thus accomplished its mandate and 
was dissolved. However, there is clearly an appetite within the ILA to continue the study of 
this crucial area of international law. A third ILA Committee on the Use of Force was 
established in November 2018, with a mandate to consider Military Assistance on Request (an 
issue dealt with briefly in the Final Report of the second committee under the heading 
‘Consent’8). The co-chairs of the third Committee are Professor Claus Kress (Germany) and 
Professor Vera Rusinova (Russia), with Professor James A. Green (UK) and Professor Tom 
Ruys (Belgium) as co-rapporteurs.9 
 
2. The work of the second Committee on the Use of Force and its Final Report on 
Aggression and the Use of Force 
 
The Committee comprised 38 members (plus alternates) from 21 ILA Branches. The 
Committee itself held six meetings;10 in addition there were meetings and open working 
sessions at the biannual ILA conferences in Sofia (2012), Washington (2014), Johannesburg 
(2016) and Sydney (2018). Given the difficulty of getting members together (the ILA has no 
funding for this purpose), much work was done by email. Each main draft of the Report was 
circulated to all Committee members for comment. Individual members prepared background 
papers, which were very helpful when it came to the preparation of the Report. As is stated 
therein, ‘[t]he Report is a result of collective work conducted in a contested field of law.’11 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (n 5) section B.3. 
9 For information regarding the newly established third ILA Committee on the Use of Force, see www.ila-
hq.org/index.php/committees (and select ‘Use of Force: Military Assistance on Request’). 
10 Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (n 5) 1. 
11 Ibid. See the members listed in footnote 1 of the Report. 
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The Committee was large by ILA standards, and there were inevitably differing views 
on some fundamental points. Nevertheless, as the Final Report records: 
 
While not all members can be committed to the precise formulation of each and every 
point in this report, it is believed that the report reflects a common general position on 
the current state of debate in the areas covered by the report.12  
 
The Final Report is concise, just 30 pages long (in line with ILA requirements). It nevertheless 
covers a broad sweep of the jus ad bellum, without in any sense attempting to be 
comprehensive. It chiefly aims to state the law, but it does not hesitate to discuss questions of 
legal policy where appropriate, for example, in relation to Security Council authorization.  
 
The Report is divided into the following parts and sections:  
 
Part A: Context 
             A.1. Introduction 
             A.2. Clarification of jus ad bellum terms and concepts 
Part B: Lawful uses of force 
             B.1. Security Council authorization 
             B.2. Self-Defence 
                     B.2.a. Necessity and Proportionality 
                     B.2.b. Anticipatory Self-Defence 
                     B.2.c. Self-Defence against Non-State Actors 
                     B.2.d. Rescue of Nationals Abroad 
              B.3. Consent 
Part C: Particular issues 
             C.1. Humanitarian intervention 
             C.2. Cyber operations 
Part D: Aggression 
Conclusions 
 
                                                          
12 Ibid, 2. 
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The Report first deals with two terms in the UN Charter that are often not properly 
distinguished: ‘use of force’ (and especially the meaning of ‘force’) – Article 2(4); and ‘armed 
attack’ – Article 51.13 Important legal and policy issues concerning the Security Council 
authorization of the use of force are then considered.14  
Seemingly eternal, but nevertheless highly topical, issues of self-defence are covered 
next, and form a central part of the Report: they include anticipatory self-defence and self-
defence against non-state actors.15   The rescue of nationals abroad is also located in the part 
on self-defence, though that in itself may be rather question-begging. Two topical and 
controversial questions form the next part of the Report: humanitarian intervention, and cyber 
operations.  
The section of the Report on a possible right of humanitarian intervention16 first 
describes the various occasions on which such a right has been claimed, and the evolution of 
the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept.  It then concludes that  
 
[a] minority of writers hold to the view that the use of force to avert a humanitarian 
catastrophe is lawful, whereas others emphasise that a use of force to avert a 
humanitarian catastrophe will, if stringent conditions are met, fall into a legal grey area. 
The existence of such minority positions means, at least, that it is difficult to conclude 
that a right of humanitarian intervention is unquestionably unlawful…17    
 
On cyber operations, which is thus far an underdeveloped area of the international law on the 
use of force, the Report limits itself to describing briefly some of the legal issues.18 Among 
other things, the Report notes that ‘cyber operations are capable in principle of crossing the 
threshold into use of force, and in some circumstances if cyber operations directly cause 
significant damage, the question arises whether they can be said to constitute an armed attack 
giving rise to a right of self-defence on the part of the victim State.’19 It goes on to note ‘an 
emerging view … that cyber operations may constitute a use of force or even an armed attack 
if their scale and effects mirror those of a traditional kinetic use of force or armed attack.’20 
                                                          
13 Ibid, section A.2. 
14 Ibid, section B.1. 
15 Ibid, section B.2. 
16 Ibid, section C.1. 
17 Ibid, 24. 
18 Ibid, section C.2. 
19 Ibid, 25. 
20 Ibid, 25. 
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And it warns that ‘if a conclusion were to be reached that a cyber operation could properly be 
termed an armed attack, it should be noted that self-defence does not require using the same 
means as the attack which provided the trigger for its exercise: determining that a cyber 
operation was an armed attack would therefore unleash the possibility of kinetic force in self-
defence.’21   
Finally the Report turns, in its Part D, to aggression. It first describes the limited and 
uncertain role of the notion of aggression within the UN Charter collective security system, 
and then turns to the definition of the ‘crime of aggression’, which has now been incorporated 
into Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The Report notes 
that ‘concerns have been expressed about Article 8 bis of the ICC Statute, both in itself and 
because of its possible impact on the prohibition of the use of force and the crime of aggression 
under general international law.’22 The Report concludes, in unambiguous terms, that 
 
it is clear that Article 8 bis of the ICC Statute is relevant only to the crime over which 
the ICC will have jurisdiction. It neither affects the definition of ‘act of aggression’ 
within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter nor should it lead to a diminished 
appreciation of the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
and customary international law, and the constraints on States resulting therefrom.23 
 
In the conclusions, the Committee recalls that 
 
From Iraq to Crimea and Afrin, there has been concern over a lack of respect for the 
prohibition of the use of force. At the same time, there has been growing concern at the 
failure to respond adequately to modern security threats (not least, transnational 
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) and to humanitarian 
catastrophes (such as in Rwanda, Darfur and Syria). 
 
The final words of the Report nevertheless strike a positive note, positive about the law if not 
about its application by states:  
 
                                                          
21 Ibid, 26. 
22 Ibid, 28. 
23 Ibid, 29. 
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[I]t is believed that overall the current international law on the use of force, properly 





As already indicated, the second ILA Committee on the Use of Force was large and reflecting 
different perspectives. While there was general agreement on many key points, inevitably on 
others the Report does not state firm conclusions but merely seeks to reflect the current state 
of the debate.  
In addition to those points indicated above (such as on the possible effect of the 
definition of ‘crime of aggression’ for the purposes of the Rome Statute), there was general 
agreement within the Committee on the following important points, among others:  
 
• that Article 2(4) is generally accepted as referring only to the use of ‘armed’ or 
‘physical’ force;25 
• that the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) is not limited by the words 
‘against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’;26 
• that the Security Council’s powers have long been accepted as including the power to 
authorize states, or in some cases international organizations, to use force;27  
• that it is desirable to have as much clarity as possible when the Security Council 
authorizes the use of force;28  
• that the fact that the Council takes action to restore or maintain international peace and 
security after an unlawful (or questionable) use of force cannot in itself be seen as an 
endorsement of the original use of force.29 
 
Issues on which the Report reflects ‘the current state of the debate’ included the following: 
 
                                                          
24 Ibid, 30. Cf. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) 
[2005] ICJ Rep 168, para 148. 
25 Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force (n 5) 4. 
26 Ibid, 4–5. 
27 Ibid, 8. 
28 Ibid, 9. 
29 Ibid, 9. 
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• whether there is any threshold of seriousness below which a use of force does not fall 
within the Article 2(4) prohibition;30 
• whether there is a gap between ‘use of force’ and ‘armed attack’;31 
• the ‘accumulation of events’ theory;32 
• with regard to armed attacks that have already occurred, between  two  approaches to 
defining the legitimate aims of action taken in self-defence: a narrower view allowing 
only for halting and repelling an ongoing attack; and a wider view that includes halting 
and repelling but also allows for preventing further attacks which are to be expected 
under the circumstances;33 
• anticipatory self-defence;34 
• self-defence against non-state actors;35 
                                                          
30 Ibid, 5 (‘While it has been claimed that there is a de minimis threshold, there is no conclusive evidence to 
support either this or the contrary view. Cases in which States did not claim a violation of Article 2(4) do not 
necessarily prove that an incident was below the force threshold, but may simply indicate a political decision not 
to invoke a violation of Article 2(4). There may also be law enforcement activities such as the enforcement of a 
State’s fisheries jurisdiction, kept within a limit of reasonableness and necessity, which do not qualify as a use of 
force for the purposes of Article 2(4). Of course, a law enforcement situation may evolve into one involving a 
prohibited use of force. It may be that the differentiation in these cases should be based on the level of force or 
the nature of force (i.e. excluding such operations due to the nature of force being a recognised and allowed form 
of law enforcement, rather than considering them to be force that is below the Article 2(4) threshold.’ (footnotes 
omitted)). 
31 Ibid, 5–6 (‘State practice indicates that small-scale border attacks involving the use of lethal force are not 
excluded from the concept of “armed attack” and may give rise to the right of self-defence. Overall, it would 
appear that the determining criteria would more appropriately be centred upon questions of scale and effects of 
the attack. Moreover, in practice it appears that the gravity threshold attached to armed attacks is not markedly 
high, and would include most uses of force likely to cause casualties or significant property damage. As such, if 
there is a gap between “use of force” and “armed attack”, it would be relatively narrow. The gravity of the attack 
would nevertheless be a crucial factor in assessing the necessity and proportionality of a forcible response.’ 
(footnotes omitted)). 
32 Ibid, 7 (‘There is some, not entirely consistent, support for the theory, but it is unclear whether it has been 
widely accepted. The accumulation of smaller attacks may, however, be relevant from the point of view of 
anticipatory self-defence insofar as these incidents might in some circumstances support the case for likelihood 
of an imminent attack. They could also affect the modalities of self-defence when assessing the necessity and 
proportionality of the force being used.’ (footnotes omitted)). 
33 Ibid, 11.  
34 Ibid, 13–4 (‘…, there would seem to be increasing support for the view that the right to self-defence does exist 
in relation to manifestly imminent attacks, narrowly construed. …. Although the matter remains unsettled, there 
may be reason to accept that when faced with a specific imminent armed attack based on objectively verifiable 
indicators, States may engage in measures to defend themselves in order to prevent the attack. Any such measures 
would have to conform to all the earlier stated requirements of armed attack, necessity and proportionality, which 
will further constrain the anticipatory use of force, and must give primacy to effective measures by the Security 
Council.’ (footnotes omitted)). 
35 Ibid, 14–7 (‘Although the issue is still debated, there is growing recognition – including through State practice 
– that there are certain circumstances in which a State may have a right of self-defence against non-state actors 
operating extraterritorially and whose attacks cannot be attributed to the host State. The military operations by 
numerous States from a variety of regions on Syrian territory against the so-called Islamic State since 2015 have, 
in particular, demonstrated the readiness of a considerable number of States to invoke Article 51 in the context of 
operations against a non-state actor. Nonetheless, the modalities of how self-defence might be carried out in this 
context do raise considerable challenges. [The challenges are then explored] Although recent State practice can 
be read as allowing self-defence in these circumstances, certain aspects of the above discussion continue to be 
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It is difficult to predict the future impact of this Report. The ILA does not in and of itself have 
a formal authority to pronounce on the areas of law in its remit. Nonetheless, it is hoped and 
anticipated that the Final Report on Aggression and the Use of Force will carry significant 
weight in the field. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the only published work which effectively 
sets out the state of law in the field of use of force in a relatively brief manner, while 
simultaneously managing to extrapolate upon the most contested topics in this area. Given its 
comprehensive nature, as well as its format and length, the Report lends itself to becoming a 
key background text for all those interested in the international law on the use of force. It can 
thus serve not only as a teaching tool, but also as a primer for scholars, policy makers, 
journalists, and anyone with an interest in this field. 
The collective nature of this endeavour undoubtedly presented challenges, most notably 
for the logistics of coordinating discussion and meetings of a large international group. The 
plurality of opinions also meant that on occasion the Report refrained from including definitive 
conclusions on certain topics,38 in which a single-author report might have been more 
categorical. Notwithstanding, this should, in our view, demonstrate the strength of the Report 
as one which accurately portrays the current state of debate.   
The assessment of ongoing debates reflects the evolving nature of the law, noting areas 
in which certain positions may be gaining strength,39 even while remaining unsettled. 
Moreover, in other, newer, areas such as cyber operations, the Report explicitly notes the lack 
of state practice, thereby accepting that the law may yet develop in unpredictable directions. 
                                                          
debated. It must be noted, in this context, that the Security Council has the power to take action directed against 
threats to the peace by armed groups, and has taken measures of this nature in the past. By acting decisively in 
future situations of such type, the Council could reduce the risk of States taking matters into their own hands.’ 
(footnotes omitted)). 
36 Ibid, 17–8 (‘… the prevailing view is that, in the post-Charter era, only self-defence can provide for legal 
recourse to unilateral force that would otherwise violate Article 2(4). …. Reliance on the self-defence justification 
will also require abiding by the restrictions placed on the exercise of self-defence. This means that any operation 
will be subject to the self-defence principles of necessity and proportionality. These must be adhered to strictly in 
order to prevent the possibility of abusing claims of rescuing nationals as a cover for forcible operations with 
ulterior motives.’). 
37 Ibid, 19–20. The discussion in the Report on intervention by invitation/military assistance on request will no 
doubt be of interest to the new ILA Committee on the Use of Force that was established in November 2018. 
38 Such as humanitarian intervention, and self-defence against non-state actors. 
39 Such as anticipatory self-defence. 
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Accordingly, the Report aims to give a current snapshot of the law at the time of its publication, 
while recognising its capacity to evolve in the future. 
 
  
  
